[R]elegated Through No Fault of Their Own to a More Difficult  System: Applying the \u3cem\u3eObergefell\u3c/em\u3e Opinion to Custody Principles by Kalmanson, Melanie
The Modern American 
Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 2 
2017 
"[R]elegated Through No Fault of Their Own to a More Difficult" 
System: Applying the Obergefell Opinion to Custody Principles 
Melanie Kalmanson 
Florida State University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kalmanson, Melanie (2017) ""[R]elegated Through No Fault of Their Own to a More Difficult" System: 
Applying the Obergefell Opinion to Custody Principles," The Modern American: Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol10/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The 
Modern American by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. 
For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
"[R]elegated Through No Fault of Their Own to a More Difficult" System: Applying 
the Obergefell Opinion to Custody Principles 
This article is available in The Modern American: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol10/iss1/2 
''[R]ELEGATED THROUGH NO FAULT OF THEIR OWN 
TO A MORE DIFFICULT'' 1 SYSTEM: APPLYING THE 
OBERGEFELL OPINION TO CUSTODY PRINCIPLES 
Melanie Kalmanson* 
The language of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges will be interpreted and 
scrutinized far years to come due to the opinion's wide breadth of impact across multiple areas of law. This 
paper exposes an impact in an unexpected area of law. This piece aims to acknowledge implications woven 
into the Court's language, which are not recognizable at first glance, that could potentialfy transform child 
custody law and the controlling best interests framework. Speczjicalfy, Obergefell imposes a per se 
presumption that marital relationships create stabiliry and continuiry far parenting. This paper explains 
the majoriry and dissenting opinions' reasoning and structure, then dissects statements within the opinions 
that could damage the balance necessary to maintain the cumnt, delicate child custody system. This paper 
discusses the assumptions underfying the Court's statements and offers arguments and empirical evidence to 
the contrary. Then, this paper proposes solutions to mitigate the effects of an unjustified presumption of 
stabiliry within a mam·age before custody law is overtaken l?J such presumption. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court's 
recent opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges 2 has 
already resulted in a firestorm of discussion 
and will undoubtedly continue to spark 
debate and conversation. One U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, separating itself from the 
rest, 3 created sufficient disagreement for this 
country's highest court to review one of the 
most debated modem topics: same-sex 
marriage. 4 
In 103 pages, the nine Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court consolidated 
decades of American constitutional 
jurisprudence to form their arguments on 
both sides of the decision. 5 Ultimately, a slim 
majority, followed by several dissents, struck 
down state bans on same-sex marriage, 
establishing that marriage is a fundamental 
right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Just as the Court's 
precedential application demonstrated, the 
implications of the Obergefell opinion will 
have an intersectional, nationwide impact. 
As expected, many repercussions will 
come from the landmark Obergefell opinion-
discussions on the right to marry, backlash 
from disagreeing states, 7 new insight into the 
law of sexual-orientation discrimination at 
work, and battles over the balance between 
religious liberty and civil rights. 8 This Paper 
exposes a possibility for grave consequences 
in an unexpected body of law: child custody. 
Agreement among the several 
Obergefell opinions is sparse. 9 Within each 
opinion, however, the careful reader finds an 
emphasis on the importance of marriage for 
providing stability to children. The 
statements relevant to this sentiment could 
have a significant impact on custody analyses 
throughout the United States. By creating a 
per se stability presumption within a marital 
relationship, the U.S. Supreme Court created 
precedent that could harm the outcome of 
future custody analyses and the children they 
involve. This Paper evaluates the effects that 
the ObergefrD opinion will likely have on the 
child custody system and suggests ways that 
courts can proactively mitigate such biased 
and unjustified impact. Part I dissects Justice 
Kennedy's heartfelt majority opinion and 
two of the four subsequent dissents. Starting 
with a general overview of their structure 
and arguments, this Part then narrows in on 
the ever-so-subtle landmines for custody law 
within the Obergefell opinions. Part II 
explores the implications that these 
statements, aimed to highlight the 
importance of marriage to support same-sex 
marriage rights, will have on custody 
determinations moving forward-including 
how best interests analyses will change, how 
the changes likely to follow Obergefell 
compare to longstanding custody doctrines, 
and how these changes will impact a 
particular class of parents. Part III offers 
policies to mitigate the adverse effects such 
implications could have on the delicate 
balance of a child's best interests and the 
parents' fundamental rights m custody 
determinations. Part IV concludes. 
II. THE OBERGEFELL V. 
HODGES, ET AL. MAJORITY 
AND DISSENTING 
OPINIONS 
"When the justices speak, our world 
changes. Whether lauded or scorned, their 
decisions shape our future." 10 Such is true 
for an unsuspecting class of parents seeking 
custody in court actions after Obergefell 
While the dissenting opm1ons strongly 
criticized the Obergefell majority, the Justices 
found one common ground: that marriage 
provides the ideal familial foundation for 
ra1smg children. 11 This Part outlines each 
opinion's statements regarding the stability 
of marriage and what those assertions imply 
for the law of custody and parenting. 12 
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority 
In what may have been the decade's 
most anticipated decision, Justice Kennedy 
delivered an important victory for liberals and 
same-sex couples. 13 "Kennedy is a generative 
constitutional theorist, willing to work with 
raw principles of liberty, equality, and dignity 
to address the great questions of our age." 14 It 
is no wonder, then, that he authored this 
landmark opinion, answering a fundamental 
question of modern society grounded on 
liberty. 15 The majority opinion is full of 
insightful, 16 romantic, 17 and emotional 18 one-
liners that provide tremendous perspective 
into the one vote that carried the otherwise 
politically split Court to a majority. 19 
Notwithstanding its passion, the majority 
opinion is grounded in constitutional doctrine 
and legal reasoning. 20 This section explores 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion: its 
significance, structure and intersectional 
discussion, and statements on parenting. 
1. A Historical Holding 
Constitutional jurisprudence gave the 
Court two doctrinal options upon which to 
base its decision that it is unconstitutional for 
states to statutorily ban same-sex marriage. 
Each option, both grounded m the 
Fourteenth Amendment, would require 
different elements, reasoning, and structure. 
First, the Court could have established that 
homosexuals are a protected class, 21 
invalidating bans on Equal Protection 
grounds. 22 Instead, though, the Court 
concluded that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment establishes a 
fundamental right to marry that cannot be 
denied to those in same-sex relationships. 23 In 
other words, the Court predominantly 
founded its holding on Substantive Due 
Process grounds, ruling that states cannot 
limit same-sex couples' fundamental right to 
marry. Nevertheless, the reasoning was not 
isolated in Due Process. Justice Kennedy 
effectively acknowledged Equal Protection 
concerns, stating that a deprivation of a 
fundamental right is a violation of both of 
these clauses. 24 Likewise, m a thorough 
protection of the established fundamental 
right, the Court held that states must 
recognize valid same-sex marriages from 
other states. 25 
First, the Court extensively discussed 
the history, importance, and jurisprudence of 
the right to marry. Justice Kennedy 
recapitulated how marriage regimes have 
developed from an arranged union by a 
couple's parents, to legal subordination of 
women through coverture, to the current 
regime in which both parties are presumed to 
obtain equivalent property rights. 26 Second, 
the Court articulated the significance of 
marriage as the foundation of our social 
structure and the provision of exclusive rights 
and privileges to its constituents. 27 Third, the 
Court explained the development of the right 
to marry, which started on Equal Protection 
footing, from its inception m Loving v. 
Virginia-striking down bans on interracial 
marriage-through its clarifications in Zablocki 
v. Redhail-holding that bans on marriage for 
parents who were in arrears on child support 
obligations, and otherwise, are 
unconstitutional. 28 This historical analysis is 
reflective of the Due Process Clause 
conclusion of the decision. 29 
Despite its ultimate reliance on 
substantive due process, the Court contended 
that its decision was influenced by Equal 
Protection concerns due to a close nexus 
between the two Clauses. 30 Justice Kennedy 
presented an interdependence between the 
two theories and argued that one could not 
exist without the other, and that violations of 
one signal violations of the other, and vice 
versa. Whether the majority decision was 
expected is immaterial to the decision's 
significance. 31 "[The decision] is a huge step 
forward. June 26, 2015 thus will be 
remembered ... as the Court taking a historic 
step forward m advancing liberty and 
equality." 32 
2. Cross-Application of Case Law 
The fundamental right to marry 
established by Obergefell is derived from the 
word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not an 
enumerated right, or not explicitly provided 
by the Constitution, but has been established 
within the implications of the liberties granted 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 "Justice 
Kennedy described, at length, the many 
Supreme Court cases that have established 
aspects of the right to marry as a fundamental 
right." 34 Several corresponding rights have 
also been found within the term "liberty,'' 
including the right to procreation, 35 
abortion, 36 etc. Together, these rights form 
the more general liberty to autonomously 
define one's own identity. 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion 
includes expansive discussion and cross-
application of case law. This case law 
discussion puts this wide applicability into 
practice, exemplifying the wide-range of 
liberties within the right to personal identity. 37 
"An unmistakable constant . . . is that 
Kennedy is driven by strong beliefs about the 
Court's duty to protect liberty." 38 
The right to marry, as part of the 
larger liberty to make "certain personal 
choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs,'' 39 
implicates various facets of one's life. Most 
significantly, Justice Kennedy used Lawrence 
v. Texas to chronical the struggles that 
homosexuals have faced in seeking justice 
since 2003 when Lawrence was decided. 40 
Finding a right to personal intimacy and 
privacy, the Lawrence Court struck down a 
statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. In 
one line, Justice Kennedy, referring to 
Lawrence, conveys history, emotion, and the 
need for change in homosexuals' rights: 
"Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, 
but it does not achieve the full promise of 
liberty." 41 Justice Kennedy's emphasis on 
Lawrence demonstrated the 
interconnectedness of jurisprudence 
surrounding liberty interests, as Lawrence 
created a starting point for Justice Kennedy 
broadening the liberties guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause to be enjoyed equally by 
homosexuals. 
Further supporting the liberty of 
individual autonomy, 42 the Court cited 
Griswold v. Connecticut 43 and Eisenstadt v. 
Baird. 44 In the former the Court striking 
' ' 
down a Connecticut law prohibiting 
contraceptive actions, established the right 
to privacy, specifically with respect to marital 
and intimate activities, within the "liberties" 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 
In the latter, the Court, striking down a 
Massachusetts law on Equal Protection 
grounds, held that unmarried couples cannot 
be denied the right to contraception and 
have an equal right to non-reproductive 
sexual intercourse as married couples. 46 In 
Eisenstadt, the Court made the right to 
contraception a more individual right rather 
than a relational right, or a right dependent 
upon a specific relationship-here, exclusive 
to those in marital relationships. 47 Thus, the 
right to marry and the greater liberty of 
personal autonomy are applicable to several 
aspects of family life and are enjoyed 
individually, meaning such right is not 
dependent upon a relationship with another 
person. 
3. A Focused Look: What the 
ObergekD Opinion Says 
About Children and 
Parenting 
The previous two subsections 
covered what may be gathered from a close 
reading of the majority's opinion. What 
blends into the page as rhetoric, though, 
when read outside the four corners of 
Obergefell, is the damaging part for custody 
law and its constituents. The third principle 
of Justice Kennedy's "four principles and 
traditions [which] demonstrate that the 
reasons marriage 1s fundamental under the 
Constitution apply with equal force to same-
sex couples" 48 is that the right to marry 
"safeguards children and families and thus 
draws meaning from related rights of 
childrearing, procreation, and education." 49 
Note that Justice Kennedy was careful not to 
say that marriage is founded upon procreation 
because that would undermine his granting 
an equivalent fundamental right to marry to 
homosexual couples, for obvious biological 
reasons. 50 This principle of protecting 
children was then reaffirmed by two of the 
following three dissents, despite the dissents' 
overarching disagreement and hostility 
towards the majority's other arguments. 51 
Going into the custody framework, 
which is guided by an analysis of several 
factors surrounding the child's best interests, 52 
Justice Kennedy explicitly addressed the 
benefits that marriage-homosexual and 
heterosexual equally-provides to familial 
structures and the downstream effects such 
benefits have on the children being raised in 
those marriages. The majority states, "[b]y 
giving recognition and legal structure to their 
parents' relationship, marriage allows children 
'to understand the integrity and closeness of 
their own family and its concord with other 
families in their community and in their daily 
lives."' 53 In other words, Kennedy suggested 
that children, as well as the majority of 
society, recognize an increased legitimacy in a 
married relationship. Further, as if speaking 
directly to the statutory custodial emphasis on 
continuity and stability within the best 
interests framework, 54 Kennedy wrote, 
"Marriage also affords the permanency and 
stability important to children's best interests." 55 He 
added: 
Without the recognition, 
stability, and predictability 
marriage offers, [unmarried 
parents'] children suffer the 
stigma of knowing their 
families are somehow lesser. 
[The children] also suffer the 
significant material costs of 
being raised by unmarried 
parents, relegated through no 
fault of their own to a more 
difficult and uncertain fami!J life. 
The marriage laws at issue 
here thus harm and humiliate 
the children of same-sex 
couples. 56 
The inverse of the majority's 
statements here is that children of 
unmarried, or single, parents sense a 
feeling of dishonor and disconnect within 
their familial structure. Justice Kennedy 
is, thus, assuming that marital structure 
inherently affects a parents' ability to 
provide pride and protection to a child; 
that non-marital relationships are 
inherently unstable for childrearing. 
Thereby, he justified his decision to grant 
all-encompassing marital rights to same-
sex couples to protect children being 
raised within their homes. Perhaps Justice 
Kennedy did not recognize what he was 
doing here with language that could be 
applied so broadly. He seems to assume, 
for purposes of this argument, that same-
sex couples' children are the on!J ones 
affected in this way. But, the absoluteness 
of his language suggests otherwise-that 
this detrimental impact of being raised by 
unmarried parents is overarching to all 
children. 
Justice Kennedy's reasoning 
seems to frustrate common 
knowledge about the parent-child 





commitment and/ or love to children 
and society and those children are 
thereby publicly humiliated when 
growing up within an unmarried 
family structure. Society intuitively 
assumes that children, as offspring 
depending upon their parents for 
care and protection and completely 
unaware of any characteristics that 
may seem disqualifying to an adult 
community, admire and idolize their 
parents. Justice Kennedy's 
assumptions about imposed 
humiliation based upon societal 
formalities controverts this 
fundamental understanding of 
parenting and children. 57 Though 
likely unintended, Kennedy's dicta 
carries great weight into an area of 
law involving society's most innocent 
victims. These statements will be 
further analyzed within the child 
custody context in Part III. 
B. Justice Thomas's Dissent58 
The general theme of Justice 
Thomas's dissenting opinion is that the 
majority misunderstands the meaning of 
"liberty" as it was intended m the 
Constitution. 59 He reasoned that the Due 
Process Clause generally prohibits undue 
restrictions on rights, but argued that the 
government did something of the opposite 
here. Justice Thomas argued that petitioners' 
claim fell outside the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because they asked 
the government to give them governmentally 
imposed rights. 60 In other words, Justice 
Thomas argued that you cannot claim a 
deprivation of due process for a lack of 
regulation or recognition by the government 
when you are, naturally to the contrary, 
allowed to carry on without government 
restraint. This is the positive versus negative 
rights dichotomy, or that the government 
not granting marriage benefits 1s not a 
restriction or denial of an existing right. To 
that end, Justice Thomas argued: 
Petitioners cannot claim, 
under the most plausible 
definition of 'liberty,' that they 
have been imprisoned or 
physically restrained by the 
States for participating in 
same-sex relationships. To the 
contrary, they have been able 
to cohabitate and raise their 
children [and conduct other 
parts of private life] in peace 
[without government 
restriction]. 61 
Basically, Justice Thomas argued that the 
Due Process Clause is not a source of 
new rights wherein same-sex couples 
may find recognition and the 
accompanying dignity, privileges, and 
benefits. Instead, he contends that due 
process guarantees the right to be free of 
government intrusion on same-sex 
couples' intimate lives. Therefore, he 
argues, that petitioners and all other 
same-sex couples shall carry on as they 
have, in the privacy of their homes and 
able to define their identity by their 
relationships, albeit unofficial. But states 
are not affirmatively obligated to provide 
the couples anything-including formal 
recognition of their relationship through 
marriage. 
Notwithstanding his disagreement 
with the majority, Thomas, like Kennedy, 
centralized the relationship between 
childbearing and marriage. Thomas took 
the parenting stability argument a step 
further, by making it the founding purpose 
of the marital union. He contends that 
marriage "arose not out of a desire to shore 
up an invidious institution like slavery, but 
out of a desire 'to increase the likelihood 
that children will be born and raised in 
stable and enduring family units by both 
the mothers and the fathers who brought 
them into this world."' 62 In other words, 
marriage was created to bind two adults for 
the purpose of securing the children 
created within that parental relationship. 
Contextualizing this argument within the 
framework of the Obergefell majority to 
which he is dissenting, Thomas seems to 
contend that recognizing same-sex marriage 
is unnecessary, or incorrect, because same-
sex couples are incapable of procreating. 63 
Further, Justice Thomas partially 
implied that the two-adult family structure 
alone provides stability. 64 He wrote, 
"[p ]etitioners misunderstand the institution 
of marriage when they say that it would 
'mean little' absent governmental 
recognition." 65 Here, he suggested that 
simply having two parents-or adults-in a 
household provides stability, regardless of 
the couple receiving the marriage 
accompanying rights from the government 
when their relationship is formally 
recognized as a marriage. In some sense, this 
is consistent with Kennedy's "material 
benefits" statement. 66 Both suggested that by 
virtue of having two adults in the house, 
tangible benefits that equate to stability are 
felt. There is empirical credence to these 
statements;67 however, there is also empirical 
evidence of successes of the inverse. 68 
C. Justice Alito's Dissent69 
Generally, Justice Alito's dissent 
contended that the Court, by making this 
decision on unsupported constitutional 
grounds, invaded upon the states' rights to 
regulate and define marriage. 7° First, Justice 
Alito characterized the majority as a 
charitable effort to same-sex individuals who 
may now enjoy benefits of marriage. He 
wrote, "Although the Court expresses the 
point in loftier terms, its argument is that the 
fundamental purpose of marriage is to 
promote the well-being of those who choose 
to marry." 71 
Justice Alito then condemned the 
Court for even deciding the issue at all. He, 
consistent with his previous decisions, 72 said 
that this is a matter for the Legislature. 
Concluding, Justice Alito stated, "All 
Americans, whatever their thinking on that 
issue, should worry about what the 
majority's claim of power portends,'' 73 
because, m his opinion, the majority 
overreached. 
Despite his disagreement with the 
majority, though, Justice Alito furthers the 
overarching theme of emphasizing marital 
stability. Adding his own take on the 
benefits of marriage, Justice Alito stated, 
"[m]arriage provides emotional fulfillment 
and the promise of support in times of need. 
And by benefitting persons who choose to 
wed, marriage indirectly benefits society 
because persons who live in stable, fulfilling, and 
supportive relationships make better citizens." 74 As 
will be elucidated below, Justice Alito's 
position on marital stability may be the most 
extreme for those on the receiving end. He 
assumes that formal recognition by the 
government is somehow required for inter-
human commitment. He also assumes, or at 
least implies, that these products of marital 
stability cannot otherwise be produced. 
These assumptions are negated by 
committed couples, oftentimes heterosexual, 
who simply choose not to be married for 
one reason or another. 75 Courts have also 
recognized the opposite of these 
assumptions; the Supreme Court of 
California stated: "The fact that a man and 
woman live together without marriage, and 
engage in a sexual relationship, does not in 
itself invalidate agreements between them 
relating to their earnings, property, or 
expenses." 76 
Ill. THE OPINION'S CUSTODY 
IMPLICATIONS 
Similar to the precedent underlying 
Obergefel!s ruling, there is great 
intersectionality in the repercussions of this 
opinion. As the Court explains, marriage 
provides a wide array of rights, privileges, 
and benefits to its participants: 
taxation; inheritance and 
property rights; rules of 
intestate succession; spousal 
privilege m the law of 
evidence; hospital access; 
medical decision making 
authority; adoption rights; 
the rights and benefits of 
survivors; birth and death 
certificates; professional 
ethics rules; campaign 
finance restrictions; workers' 
compensation benefits; 
health insurance; and child 
custody, support, and 
visitation rules. 77 
Thus, all of the corresponding areas of 
law-taxation, estate planning, property, 
family and divorce, etc.-in which marriage 
is interwoven in the policies, rules, and 
regulations, will see effects from this ruling. 78 
However, the Court seems to ironically 
ignore these correlated parts of marriage in 
the effect of its reasoning. 
Though the crux of the Obergefell 
opinion is about creating marital unions-or 
broadening access to marriage, it must also 
be analyzed in the context of such unions 
being broken, or divorce-the prevalence of 
which demands equal attention. 79 "[O]ne 
million children experience parental divorce 
each year." 80 So, by expanding marital 
opportunity, the logical result 1s an 
expansion of divorce as well. 
Therefore, an area of law that will be 
affected by Obergefell is child custody. 81 The 
major underlying assumption of the majority 
and dissenting opinions 1s directly 
juxtaposed with the area of law they greatly 
affect. Custody cases do not arise until an 
"emotional fulfillment" and "promise of 
support" is broken. 82 More plainly, the 
Court seems to avoid divorce altogether. If 
the Court fully grasped this "new generation[ 
],"it would understand that divorce is just as 
much a real concern as same-sex marriage, as 
are the accompanying custody disputes. 83 
Due to jurisdictional boundaries between 
state and federal courts, which are based in 
the states' rights to autonomously regulate 
issues related to family life, 84 it is rare for 
Federal courts, let alone the Supreme Court 
of the United States, to discuss issues even 
remotely associated with custody. Thus, the 
language of Obergefell creates an "ace card" 
for the custodial party it happens to favor 
that cannot be outweighed with equivalent 
authority. This Section canvases how 
Obergefel!s rhetoric-outlined in Part II 
above-will affect custody law. 
A. An Unduly Weighted Best 
Interests Analysis 
The best interests framework is the 
center of custody systems nationwide. 85 To 
determine the custody configuration that 
best suits a child's needs, 86 courts weigh 
several statutory factors within the context 
of each parent's individual circumstances. 
Depending on the resulting balance, the 
child will either split time evenly with both 
parents, known as equal time-sharing, or the 
parent with more favorable circumstances 
will be awarded primary time-sharing, or the 
majority of time and physical care for the 
child with prescribed visitation to the other 
parent. 
The child's interest in maintaining 
continuity and stability generally guides best 
interests analyses. 87 The Obergefell majority 
would like us to believe that by simply saying 
"I do,'' a parent unlocks a magic door to 
providing stability and security to his or her 
child, that by entering into marriage, a 
household is inherently the more beneficial 
atmosphere for raising a child. However, 
consider a scenario in which the original 
custody determination gave primary custody 
to a single mother, who devotes her free 
time to raising her child and will likely not 
get married and was never married before. 
Then, the child's father marries his spouse as 
a result of newly legalized same-sex marriage 
and files for custody modification arguing 
that he can provide more continuity and 
stability for the child than the mother 
because he is now married. Is a reviewing 
court obligated, under Obergefell, to assume 
that, by virtue of his marriage, the father has 
an upper hand in the continuity and stability 
factor, despite the fact that the mother has 
been the primary caretaker for an extended 
period of time? 88 The presumption of 
marital stability from Obergefell creates, or 
otherwise furthers, competing concerns with 
continuity and stability for maintaining the 
same routine and caretaker. 
Moreover, imagine a custody dispute 
m which a mother, in celebration of 
Obergefell, legally married her short-term 
girlfriend. The father, who is not remarried, 
was awarded pnmary custody of his 
elementary school son a few years pnor, 
following a best interests analysis. 
Employing the precedent of Obergefell, the 
mother petitions the court to modify 
custody based on her heightened stability 
resulting from her new marriage. If a court 
interprets Obergefell how it is likely to be 
interpreted based on the statements 
highlighted in this paper and grants the 
mother's petition, the decision could likely 
be in grave contrast to some more important 
best interests factors that likely influenced 
the original best interests analysis. 
The Obergefell presumption-
specifically m Justice Thomas' 
articulation89-assumes that both adults are 
adequately capable of being parents. Not 
only is this contradicted by common 
scenarios, but is also empirically disputed by 
the volume of cases the custody system and 
child protective services process each year. 90 
If all parents were capable, the system would 
not be so flooded with children needing 
protection from unfit parents, both single 
and married. What the Obergefell decision fails 
to consider in creating this presumption of 
stability within a marriage is that "[t]he 
stability and continuity of the child's 
environment can be affected by many 
things." 91 One may interpret the statements 
discussed herein as addressing but one of 
those many factors rather than determining 
one exclusive factor; however, the Obergefell 
Court weighs too heavily the stability that 
accompanies marriage for this to be clear. 
Returning to the first hypothetical-
single never-been-married mother with 
newly-wed homosexual dad-what does the 
Obergefell presumption imply about non-
marital sex? For a seemingly progressive 
opinion, the opinion still implies problems 
for parents of children out of wedlock-an 
antiquated doctrine. 92 Nevertheless, the 
presumption may urge custody courts to 
further condemn non-marital sex. At best, if 
the mother here ends up having another 
adult move into the home, it is a coin toss 
between whether the custody court will 
follow Kennedy's assumption against non-
marital stability and Thomas's reasoning that 
any two-adult household is tangibly better 
than a one-adult household. Either way, this 
superficial, structural analysis seems to 
subjugate the meaning of parenting and the 
actual value that a good parent provides to 
his or her child-love, support, and 
guidance-regardless of monetary resources 
or marital status. 
B. Presumption Contradictory to 
Custody Laws 
When applied strictly, the 
presumption of stability within a married 
family unit, and accompanying preference 
for placing children in those homes based 
upon the stability focus of the best interests 
analysis, is contradictory to other custody 
laws and principles. Also written into 
several states' laws is a negative best 
interests factor when a parent 1s 
encouraging a step-parent (when the parent 
is remarried) or other third party to play a 
parental role. 93 Thus, when a parent 
("Parent 1") is remarried and encouraging 
the new spouse ("Step-Parent") to play a 
parenting role superior to that of the other 
parent ("Parent 2" /ex-spouse of Parent 1) 
and the courts apply the Obergefell 
presumption of stability to the new 
marriage, Parent 2's parental rights are 
undermined by Parent l's remarriage and 
Step-Parent's interference. This directly 
contradicts the purpose of these statutes 
that instruct the court to consider a Step-
Parent's role and ensure that the two per se 
original parents maintain their roles in the 
child's life. If the Obergefell presumption is 
incorporated in such situations, though, the 
best interests analysis may be skewed. 
Further, this presumption towards a 
married family unit resembles the outdated 
presumption of legitimacy. The presumption 
of legitimacy aimed to protect children from 
being ridiculed by both society and policy, 94 
such as intestate laws at the death of a 
parent. 95 These outdated laws automatically 
gave parental rights to the married husband 
of the biological mother, regardless of 
whether he was the biological parent of the 
child. 96 However, "the old model that 
children born out of wedlock had no legal 
rights unless legitimated no longer exists." 97 
In fact, the patriarchal model is not so much 
the norm in modem society. 98 "[S]ocial 
norms concerning parenthood have shifted 
dramatically in recent years, 'although mixed 
reactions toward single parenthood 
persist."' 99 Regardless of society's reaction, 
statistics affirm the shift in family structure: 
D 24% of children in 2014 did not live 
with two adults. 100 
o Another 4% lived with one 
parent who was cohabiting, 
meaning 28% of children in 
2014 did not live with two 
parents. 101 
o 5.5% of children in 2014 lived 
with one biological or 
adoptive parent and a 
stepparent. 102 
D Only 63.8% of children in 2014 lived 
with two biological or adoptive 
parents. 103 
D By race, children who lived with two 





o 58% Hispanic 
o 34% Black-alone 
non-
Kennedy argues that societal changes justify 
a shift in precedent and jurisprudence. Thus, 
this presumption of stability within married 
families and preference towards a patriarchal 
structure should not predominate the 
custody best interests analysis. Punishing 
single parents, instead, "ends up punishing 
single parents' children." 105 Thus, children 
would be the victims of an overbearing 
integration of the Obergefell marital 
presumption in custody laws. 106 
C. Unjustified Prejudice to Single 
Parents 
Taking the implications of the Court's 
opinions a step further, as demonstrated in 
Section III.B., the most affected opponents 
of the opinions' overarching insinuation are 
single parents. Although the presumption of 
legitimacy has been removed from parenting 
laws, a modem stigma remains against single 
parents. 107 Nevertheless, "[w]hile the overall 
population continues to increase in the 
United States, the proportion of the 
population that 1s married continues to 
drop." 108 As indicated above, single parents 
are caring for approximately twenty-four 
percent of the nation's children 109 "and are 
the most rapidly growing family form in 
America." 110 The Obergefell opinion 
revitalizes this stigma concern, though. 
This Obergefell presumption further 
damages single parents' legitimacy as 
adequate parents. Despite Kennedy's and the 
dissents' implied presumption, single 
parents-nevertheless disadvantaged-are 
not innately inadequate. In fact, they may 
offer unique advantages to childrearing that 
marital families do not. For example, 
"[s Jingle-parent families are far less 
hierarchical and far more cooperative and 
communal than most two-parent marital 
families."' 111 They "'also generate a different 
gender dynamic, one which is most intertwined in the Obergefell opinions are far 
supportive of egalitarian sex roles and too black-and-white to be applied to custody 
1 "' 112 undermines traditional gender ro es, analyses. 
which, following Obergefell and in the midst 
All in all "children's needs should be 
' 
of modern developments, is something of 
addressed, and all single-parent families must 
significant value in modern society. "'Single-
· J: " 119 be valued regardless of their 10rms, 
parent families also provide models of 
especially when determining the best 
support networks, familial and 
interests outcome. Notwithstanding their 
nonfamilial."' 113 
differences, reverting to the most 
Further expanding upon Justice fundamental analysis, "[e]ven by 
Alito's input on the effects of a marital conventional, 'bright-line,' legal concepts of 
relationship, we come to the conclusion that family-by 'blood, marriage, and/or 
children with married parents will make adoption'-single-parent families are entitled 
f . 1 114 better citizens than those o smg e parents. to belong." 120 In other words, single-parent 
Yet, common sense and empirical examples families are increasingly prevalent in today's 
of successful people being raised by single society and reap unique benefits on their 
parents tell us that this is false. 115 The members. 
success and efficiency of parenting is a 
The legal validation of stigma within 
product of multiple variables. 116 A single 
Obergefell furthers single parents' struggles, in 
parent-which would include a widow or 
spite of their competency to parent. "[T]he 
. d117 . widower who was once marne -is not 
presence and repetition of the justifications 
inherently incapable of providing stability 
for stigma within a legal context cloak these 
and continuity for his or her child and 
justifications with the legitimacy and 
raising a healthy, successful, law-abiding 
presumed objectivity of the law. The law as 
citizen. 118 Hence, the conclusions 
l'd . ,,121 ideology reinforces and va i ates stigma. 
The Obergefell opinions do just that by 
creating a presumption against single parents 
for adequacy and legitimacy as caregivers to 
this country's future generations. 122 "[S]ingle-
parent families should not be stigmatized, 
and support should be available to needy 
children irrespective of family form." 123 
Thus, the Obergefell presumption-if 
accepted by custody courts, or even one 
court-furthers the inappropriate stigma 
against single parents. 
IV. MITIGATING THE 
OBERGEFELLIMPACTON 
CUSTODY ANALYSES 
Undisputedly, there is strong support 
for the proposition that marriage provides 
stability to family structure that, in turn, 
benefits children being raised by married 
couples. Empirical evidence shows 
employment and wealth benefits are 
associated with marriage relationships. 124 
Though, this is not absolute. It is not 
guaranteed, just by the fact that two people 
are married that their relationship 1s 
healthy-or that the relationship is healthy 
for children to be raised within-or that the 
married individuals are fit to be parents. 
Likewise, custody courts should not operate 
on an inherent bias against single parents as 
a result of the Obergefell opinion. Such bias 
would further the injustice that children 
subjected to the best interests analysis face 
when courts arbitrarily weigh factors based 
upon their external and personal 
preferences, rather than the facts specific to 
each case. 125 
Further, a parent's choice to be 
remarried after a divorce is just that: a 
choice. This choice is a part of the very right 
that Obergefell aimed to safeguard-the right 
to make choices to define one's identity. The 
progression of marriage laws makes each 
individual equal within a partnership, both of 
"'who[m] share work and family 
responsibilities equitably."' 126 "Therefore, 
both parties can restructure their post-
divorce lives equally in private and public 
spheres." 127 In order to effectuate such 
freedom, the system must not allow for 
parenting rights to be affected by parents' 
remarriage choices following divorce. 
Courts can implement strategies to 
avoid detrimentally affecting the delicate 
custody system from the biased implications 
of this unmatched precedent from Obergefell 
Such strategies will generally aid the custody 
system by enforcing open -mindedness to all 
factors of the best interests analysis. 
Primarily, it should be emphasized to the 
courts that the marital status of a parent is 
exactly how it appears in the best interests 
statute-but one fact within a list of several 
facts that, together, form the overall 
framework of a child's environment. Texas, 
for example, has taken this a step further and 
statutorily declares that the marital status of 
a parent should not affect a best interest 
analysis: 
"The court shall consider the 
qualifications of the parties 
without regard to their marital status 
or to the sex of the party or the 
child in determining: 
(1) which party to appoint as 
sole managing 
conservator; 
(2) whether to appoint a party 
as joint managing 
conservator; and 
the terms and conditions of 
conservatorship and possession of an 
access to the child." 128 
When closely considered, the answer can cut 
both ways. One specific marital status could, 
in theory, be both beneficial and unfavorable 
to the analysis depending on the 
circumstances. So, "[i]nstead of seeing the 
single-parent family as inherently 
dysfunctional, the law should recognize the 
prevalence and importance of single-parent 
families .... [In fact], single parenting is the 
most common pattern within marriage as 
well as after divorce." 129 Single parenting 
should, therefore, be accepted within the 
custody best interests analysis and 
intertwined as part of the circumstances 
affecting the overall analysis. 
Notwithstanding a press for less 
emphasis on marital status, when considered 
in the best interests analysis, Obergefell directs 
an equal view of any marriage. With the 
expansion of marriage rights to homosexual 
couples, as equal to heterosexual couples, 
courts must similarly be sensitive and 
proactive to apply any preference towards 
marriage equally. After Obergefell, courts must 
view homosexual and heterosexual marriages 
as equal. 
But, is that application a legal fiction? 
Though policies are slowly progressing, the 
benches of this country-both state and 
federal-remain predominantly 
conservative. 130 As a result, regardless of 
policy suggesting or advising otherwise, 
judges-given their great discretion m 
making custody determinations-may still 
enforce personal stigmas against homosexual 
parents. 131 This restrained approach and 
possibility for personal influence 
significantly increases the importance of 
statutes like the one from Texas above-
codifying a rejection of prejudice to marital 
status or, now, sexuality within marriage. A 
statute effectuating this equality would look 
like this: 
The court shall consider the 
marital status of either 
parent as one factor within 
the best interests analysis 
and without regard to the parent's 
relationship's sexuality or to the 
sex of the parent's spouse 
when determining: 
(1) how marital status will 
affect the best interests 
analysis; 
(2) how time-sharing with the 
child will be divided 
between the parties; and 
(3) how decision-
making related to 
the child will be 
divided between 
the parties. 
The most valuable aspect to be protected 
here is the delicate best interests analysis. 
Systemically, the framework has enough 
flaws, so disallowing Obergefell from upsetting 
the status quo is imperative. The stability of 
a married couple cannot be the sole basis for 
a custody determination and should not be 
unduly weighed against other factors. Just as 
the best interests statutes provide several 
factors, the courts should weigh several 
factors in each analysis. Despite the strength 
of the Obergefell precedent, custody courts 
should not allow parties to use this 
precedent as a trump card to overstep all 
other factors. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, in the majority's 
valiant effort to afford equal marriage rights 
to same- sex couples and the Dissents' 
vocalization of passionate concerns about 
the outcome, imparted antagonistic 
presumptions on children's best interests. It 
did so via its dicta regarding marital stability 
within the Obergefell opinion. 
Custody law, though often 
overlooked, is one of the most sensitive, and 
arguably most important, areas of law. The 
subjects of the fact-intensive analyses are 
some of the country's most innocent and 
helpless victims of the justice system, both 
when it gets the answer right and even more 
so when it gets it wrong. Thus, it is the 
responsibility of lawmakers and the judiciary 
to protect the children of this country with 
its laws and its decisions. Whether Justice 
Kennedy and the subsequent dissents in 
Obergefell intended to impact custody law is 
irrelevant to the importance of avoiding 
detrimental effects to the custody system. 
The presumption of marital stability 
for child rearing imparted in the Obergefell 
opinions must be recognized and proactively 
mitigated through conscious awareness by 
the courts analyzing best interest factors. 
When marital status is considered, though, 
Obergefell instructs that homosexual and 
heterosexual marriages be regarded as equal. 
Marital status of a parent is but one factor in 
a multi-factor framework, and the 
fundamental right to marry is one of 
choice within one's larger right to define 
one's own identity. Therefore, courts 
must not allow the recent Supreme 
Court decision and marital status to 
outweigh other important factors that 
indicate ideal parenting. 
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